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COUNTRY Korea

SUBJECT Expression of Anti-Soviet Views by North Korean
Defense Minister

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THE FOLLOWING REPORT WAS PROMISED

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1. At a meeting of the North Korean military staff CH'OE Yong-
kŏn, who is recognized as leader of the pro-Chinese Communist clique in North
Korea, made the following points in a lengthy address:

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- a. Soviet policy in Asia is not one of liberating oppressed peoples but one of
fomenting small wars and wrecking the economies of small nations. Now, the
Soviets are attempting to start a general war in which all Asiatics will
eventually engage America. The Chinese Communists are unable to understand
why the Soviets do not support more strongly a North Korean and Chinese
settlement at P'anmunjom. True Korean nationalists and their Chinese allies
are becoming suspicious of Soviet intentions. The Soviets have openly
demonstrated that they are more interested in liberating Japan than in the
peaceful reconstruction of territories which have been liberated by the
people's republics.
- b. Unless the Soviet Union makes a definite promise to intervene in the Korean war,
the only alternative is a North Korean and Chinese agreement with the United
Nations. An armistice agreement will permit the liberation of South Korea
from within. However, recently revealed Soviet policy clearly shows that the
Soviets desire to provoke the Chinese into making rash decisions to widen the
war, while the Soviets sit back and talk about peace.
- c. The Soviets fear that the Chinese Communists will break with the Kremlin if
the Korean war is settled, and want the North Koreans and Chinese to continue
fighting an indecisive war. Soviets do not care about unification of Korea;

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Soviet aid to the North Korean Army under the pretended objective of the liberation of South Korea was merely an investment by the Soviets to build another area of conflict.

2. CH'OE completed his address with the plea that North Korea and Communist China unite in protest against Soviet demands, and that North Korea support the Chinese Communists' demand that the successful conclusion of the P'anmunjom talks be reached immediately. No decision on CH'OE's proposal was made at the meeting.

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Comment. While the differences between CH'OE and KIM Il-sŏng and the Soviet clique have been frequently reported, it seems questionable that CH'OE would make remarks so strongly anti-Soviet.

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